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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

is

a

divorce . action

which

was

filed

by

the

plaintiff/respondent, hereinafter referred to as the respondent,
on October 31, 1984.

The parties had been married approximately

ten years before the Complaint was filed and had four children of
the marriage.

The parties entered into a Temporary Stipulation

and Agreement which was aifnws on October 30, 1984 and filed with
the Court on November 6, 1984.

(R. 12)

After the Stipulation,

the parties filed numerous affidavits and motions with the Court
which resulted in the Court entering five separate interim Orders
on March 28, 1985; April 18, 1985; May 8, 1985; May 9, 1985; and
October 28, 1985.

On November 5, 1985 a trial was had on this

matter which continued for five days and concluded on November
14, 1985. (81-82, 83-84, and 141)

During the trial 25 witnesses

were called and 39 exhibits were entered.
189-194)

(R. 177-179, 181-184,

The Court took the matter under advisement and entered

its ruling on November 20, 1985.
ruling consists of eight pages.

The transcript of the Court's
(R. 195, 202-210)

A motion for

a new trial was filed by the appellant on the 8th day of January,
1986, which motion was denied
288-290)

on March

6, 1986.

(R. 226,

The respondent filed an Order to Show Cause on the 7th

day of March, 1986 with a supporting affidavit and both parties
filed

memoranda

pertaining

thereto.

The Court

entered

its

Findings, Conclusions, and Order on said Order to on the 20th day
of May, 1986.

(R. 292-294, 328-343, 441-446)

A notice of appeal

was filed on May 5, 1986, and a request for a transcript was

filed

with

the Court on May

14, 1986.

(R. 428, 437)

A

transcript was not obtained and provided to this Court.
The appeal of the appellant was from the Decree of Divorce
entered by the Court and from the Order of the Court denying the
defendant's motion for a new trial.

On the 25th day of August,

1986, the appellant filed a motion before the Supreme Court
asking to augment the record on appeal by filing a copy of the
child custody report made by Dr. McVaugh and a copy of the Barry
J. Koerpel Professional Corporation Defined Benefit Plan.

This

motion was denied by the Supreme Court on September 15, 1986. On
the 5th day of November, 1986, the respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the appellant's appeal on the basis that a transcript had
not been obtained as required by Rule 11 (e)(1) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.

On December 15, 1986, the Supreme Court

denied the respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal but ruled
that "...the court limits the appellant's issues on appeal to
those of law only and does so on the representation of counsel
that no issue of fact has been raised...."
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff/respondent, Judith A. Koerpel, hereinafter
referred to as the respondent, married Barry Jon Koerpel, the
defendant/appellant, hereinafter referred to as the appellant, on
March 1, 1974 in Wisconsin.
this marriage.

The parties have four children of

Two of the children were born before their

marriage and were adopted.
after the marriage.

The other two children were born

The oldest child, Kimberly, turned 18 years

old on August 5, 1985, prior to the divorce hearing.
2

Melanie

will turn 18 years of age on November 9, 1987,

Joshua was five

years of age at the time of the divorce hearing in November of
1985 and Bradin .was three years of age.
The appellant is a doctor specializing in kidney diseases
with a practice in the Weber County area.

The respondent was

employed part time at the time of the divorce hearing in this
matter.
The parties have been involved in a divorce action since
the 30th day of October, 1984.

Numerous motions, order to show

causes and affidavits had been filed by the parties prior to the
time this matter came to trial. Those motions primarily involved
the financial businesses and affairs of the parties which were
numerous.

The parties had originally entered into a stipulation

on October 30, 1984 and Judge Ronald Oc Hyde, in an Order to Show
Cause ruling on the 18th of April, 1985, indicated

that the

parties were in a financial mess that he was not able to resolve
with the evidence presently before him and awarded temporary
custody of the children to the respondent.

(R. 12, 63-67)

The

respondent attempted to determine the assets of the parties by
motions to produce records and depositions of the appellant.

The

appellant failed to cooperate and to conform to the request.
Consequently,

the

respondent

incurred

significant

cost

in

subpeonaing records and other information for the trial with the
purpose of attempting to determine the financial assets of the
appellant.

(R. 289)

The trial of this matter

took five days, involved 25

separate witnesses, and 39 exhibits.
3

Two psychologists testified

in this matter concerning the custody of the children.

Dr.

McVaugh, based upon test results, made a mild recommendation in
favor of the appellant.

(R. 208)

Dr. Furlong recommended that

the children remain with the respondent.

Approximately four

other witnesses were called by the respondent to testify as to
her ability to care for the children and approximately three
witnesses were called by the appellant to support his claim for
custody.

(R. 177-179, 181-184, 189-195)

Both parties
their

assets

testify

as

respondent's
records

and
to

called

accountants

liabilities
certain

and

aspects

accountant, Roger

identified

to

testify

numerous
of

their

lay witnesses to
finances.

Nuttall, introduced

as Exhibits

17, 18, and

concerning

The

accounting

19 and

back up

material supporting those exhibits identified as Exhibit 23. The
appellant's accountant, Tanner/Brunson Company, prepared Exhibits
30 and 31. One of the assets was a Barry J. Koerpel Professional
Corporation Defined Benefit Plan.
Court at $236,104.00.

(R. 203)

That plan was valued by the
The appellant represented that

the plan contained approximately $113,770.62 held with Merrill
Lynch.

In fact, the moneys with Merrill Lynch were not held in

the name of the Barry J. Koerpel Professional Corporation Defined
Benefit Plan, but was held in the personal name of Dr. Koerpel.
At the time of the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the
respondent filed with the Court as Exhibit 1, photocopies of a
check

from

Merrill

Lynch,

Pierce,

Fenner,

and

Smith

dated

November 7, 1985, made out to Barry J. Koerpel, M.D. in the sum
of

$87,881.00.

The

funds

were
4

then

deposited

with

the

Professional

Pension

sometime thereafter.

Services, Inc. through Utah
(R. 406)

First Bank

The appellant also filed with the

Court Exhibit 2 which was a record from Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner and Smith indicating that Barry J. Koerpel, M.D. as of
October 26, 1985, had $114,421.85 in his personal account.

That

a withdrawal in the sum of $87,881.00 had been made leaving a
closing balance as of November 29, 1985 in the sum of $26,855.42.
(R. 407)

At the end of the first day of trial in this matter, on

November

5, 1985, the District Court Judge entered an order

restraining both parties from disposing of any of the assets
during the pendency of the trial.

(R. 179)

The trial judge took the matter under advisement for a
period of six days and entered

its order from the bench on

November

The Court concluded that the

20, 1985.

(R. 195)

evidence concerning the finances in many cases was not very clear
and that the net assets of the parties amounted to $346,884.00
and that the respondent was entitled to one-half of those assets
in the sum of $173,424.00.
appellant

was

the

moving

The Court also concluded that the
force

behind

all of

the business

ventures and that he should inherit the business assets and all
business liabilities because he was in a better position to
handle the liabilities and assets.

The Court also observed that

the appellant at all times had the means to determine the actual
state of his affairs.

The Court awarded to the respondent the

household furnishings with an assigned value of $45,000.00, the
automobiles with a value of $20,900.00, a note receivable with
the value of $9,022.00, and $100,000.00 from the Merrill Lynch
5

account.

All

contained

in

Corporation

of
the

were

the

rest

of

the

assets, including

Defined

Benefit

Plan

awarded

to

appellant

the

liabilities incurred by the parties.

and

the

those

Professional

along

with

the

(R. 202-207, 211-214)

The Court concluded from the evidence that the respondent
should be awarded the care, custody, and control of the minor
children subject to rights of visitation in the appellant.
Court

considered

the

moral

character

of

both

The

parents, the

emotional stability of the parents, personal vs. surrogate care
of the minor children by the parents, the lack of evidence of any
drug or alcohol abuse on the part of either party, the religious
compatibility of the parties, the financial conditions of the
parties, and the importance of keeping siblings together.

The

Court determined that the controlling factors in this case were
the psychological tests which resulted in a mild recommendation
for the appellant, the fact that the respondent was the primary
care provider

during

most of the children's

lives, and the

continuing of the previous custody arrangements where it seems to
be working.

The Court stated that it felt that the respondent

being the primary care provider
previous

custody

arrangements

and the continuation of the
over

weighed

the

mild

recommendation in favor of the appellant by the psychological
tests.

(R. 207-208, 214-215)
The appellant filed a motion for a new trial on January 9,

1986, asking the Court to grant a new trial or in the alternative
to take additional testimony and to amend its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions

of

Law, and Divorce Decree on the grounds that
6

insufficient evidence existed to justify the Court's decision.
(R. 226)

Affidavits, memoranda, and argument were presented to

the Court on the Motion for New Trial.

On March 6, 1986, the

Court entered the Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and an
Order on the Motion for a New Trial.
neither

of

the parties were

unfit

The Court found that

as parents and

that the

respondent had been the primary care provider during the marriage
and

had

custody

of

the children

from

Complaint was filed until the hearing.

the time the Divorce

The Court concluded that

the information presented at the trial was not sufficient to
cause the Court to transfer the custody of the children from the
primary care provider.

The Court also found that the appellant

had failed to cooperate with the plaintiff in her attempt to
discover information concerning the property of the parties and
that the appellant had ample opportunity to discover the status
of his properties and liabilities and to have provided that
information at the time of the trial.

The Court concluded that

there was no basis for excusable error or neglect on the part of
the

appellant

in not

knowing

the

nature

and

properties he had acquired during the marriage.

value

of the

(R. 288-289)

The appellant appealed from the denial of a motion for a
new trial.

However, the appellant in his brief does not pursue

that appeal and in his Brief states he only appeals the Findings
of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce entered by
Judge Roth.
No evidence was presented at the time of the trial to the
effect that a Defined Benefit Plan had been created in accordance
7

with the Internal Revenue Code as represented by the appellant in
his brief under Findings of Facts, Paragraph 2.

During the

trial, the appellant did not raise the issue of whether or not
the Court could award to the respondent part of the Defined
Benefit Plan.

This issue was addressed for the first time by the

Court in an Order

to Show Cause filed by the respondent to

enforce collection of the $100,000.00. The appellant claimed the
Court could not enforce the order.
Court which

are

referred

The Findings of the District

to in the appellant's Brief under

Statement of Facts, Paragraph 4, are those entered by Judge Roth
on May 20, 1986, pursuant to the Order to Show Cause which was
filed by the respondent.

In that Order the Court stated:

That the Court has considered the argument of the
defendant, that the Employment Retirement Security
Act (ERISA) prohibits the Court from transferring
the money held in the Merrill Lynch money market
certificates to the plaintiff because it is not a
qualified domestic relations order. The Court has
reviewed the law on this matter and finds that the
federal act does not prohibit the Court from
exercising its personal jurisdiction in ordering
him to terminate the plan. The Court finds that
the plan can be voluntarily terminated by Dr.
Koerpel and that the Court has the authority to
hold him in contempt if he fails to terminate the
plan and turn over the money as previously
ordered
(R. 442-443)
The appellant did not appeal from the Order on Order to Show
Cause, and consequently the issues raised in the Order to Show
Cause and the decision of the Court are not properly before this
Court for review.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING THE
RESPONDENT CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN
This Court has ruled that the appellant is restricted to arguing
issues of law because he failed to provide a transcript of the
lower Court's proceedings.

It is the respondent's position that

the request of the appellant that this Court overturn the lower
Court's decision in awarding custody of the children is primarily
an issue of fact and may not be pursued at this time in light of
the Supreme Court's ruling.

The respondent also contends that

the lower Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody
of the minor children to the respondent.

That the facts and

evidence submitted in the lower Court adequately supported and
compelled that decision by the trial judge.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR BY INEQUITABLY DIVIDING
THE ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE PARTIES
The respondent contends that this issue is one of fact and
not one of law.

The appellant did not cite any law in his Brief

supporting his request that the lower Court's decision concerning
the liabilities and assets of the party be overturned.
Court

received

extensive

evidence

concerning

The lower

the assets and

liabilities of the parties and concluded that the appellant had
failed

to provide

depositions

and

the

motions

necessary
for

information

discovery

and

in response to
had

failed

adequately inform the Court of his liabilities and assets.

to
The

Court awarded to the appellant all assets and liabilities except
9

for the furniture, vehicles, a contract, and $100,000.00 cash
held with Merrill Lynch.

The respondent believes the Court

ruling was supported by the evidence and was not an abuse of the
Court's discretion.
POINT III
THE COURT'S ORDER AWARDING THE RESPONDENT $100,000.00
OF THE SUM HELD IN THE MERRILL LYNCH MONEY MARKET
WAS LEGAL AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BY THIS COURT
The appellant contends that the Trial Court is prohibited
by federal law from awarding $100,000.00 of the money held in
Merrill Lynch Money Market to the respondent.

The respondent

contends that this issue was not raised during the trial of this
matter, but was addressed by the Court in an Order to Show Cause
filed thereafter.

The appellant has not appealed the Court's

ruling in the Order to Show Cause and consequently this matter is
not properly before the Court.

The respondent also contends that

the money held in the Merrill Lynch Money Market account was held
in the individual name of the appellant, Dr. Koerpel, and not in
the name of the Pension and Profit Sharing Fund.

Consequently,

the federal law, if applicable, would have no effect upon the
lower Court's decision.

In the event this Court determines that

the federal law is applicable, it does not prohibit the action
taken by the Trial Court and cannot interfere with the personal
jurisdiction the Court has over the individual and the right of
the Trial Court to hold the appellant in contempt if he fails to
voluntarily

terminate the profit and pension sharing plan in

order to withdraw the $100,000.00.
10

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING THE
RESPONDENT CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN
Rule 11(e)(2) U.R.A.P. states as follows:
If the appellant intends to urge an appeal that a
finding or a conclusion is unsupported by or is
contrary to the evidence, he shall include in the
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to
such findings or conclusion.
The appellant in the memorandum filed with this Court in response
to the respondent's motion for dismissal stated that he was not
claiming

that the lower Court had committed error or made a

finding unsupported or contrary to evidence.

Based upon that

representation, this Court ruled that the appellant does not have
the right to argue any factual issues to support its appeal.
Point II of the appellant's Brief which deals with the custody of
the minor children specifically states that the Court abused its
discretion
respondent.

in

awarding

the

custody

of

the children

to the

It is the position of the respondent that in light

of the Supreme Court's ruling there is no way the appellant can
be allowed to continue to pursue this part of his appeal.
The primary focus of the appellant's appeal concerning the
custody of the children is that the Court committed error in the
weight it placed upon the fact that the respondent had been the
primary care provider for the children and that the evidence was
not sufficient to move the children from the respondent's care
into that of the appellant's.

The parties did not make a big

issue concerning the oldest minor child, Melanie, who turned 17
11

during the course of the trial.

It was the feeling of the

parties that she was old enough to live with whichever parent she
elected.

The main focus was on the custody of Joshua, who was

five years of age, and Bradin, who was three years of age.

The

testimony given at the trial was undisputed that the respondent
had been the primary care provider for these children from their
birth until the time of the trial.

The Court also considered the

fact that these children had been living with the respondent from
the beginning of the divorce action in October of 1984 until the
time of the trial in November of 1985.

The appellant complains

that a temporary order of the Court should not have any bearing
upon the long term determination of the custody.

The appellant

overlooks the fact that the parties entered into a temporary
stipulation

on the date the Divorce Complaint was prepared,

October 30, 1984, wherein the appellant voluntarily agreed that
the

respondent

could

have

the

temporary

care, custody, and

control of the parties four minor children, subject to reasonable
rights of visitation.

(R. 12)

The District Court later affirmed

the temporary custody in the respondent.

(R. 65)

At the time of the trial, the Court determined from the
evidence that the children had been cared for properly and had
functioned well during the approximate one year that they had
been in the temporary custody of their mother the respondent.
The Court found that there was no reason to change the custody
from the primary care provider to the appellant and concluded
that there was no evidence to demonstrate that the appellant
would be a superior parent to the respondent.
12

The Court did find

that there was a mild recommendation by one of the psychiatrists
based upon the psychological test administered by Dr. McVaugh,
but that that mild recommendation did not over weigh the other
considerations.

It should be pointed out that a psychiatrist

also testified

in the trial on behalf of the respondent and

recommended that she would be the fit and proper parent to have
the permanent care, custody, and control of the minor children.
The

Court

also

heard

seven

other

witnesses

who

testified

concerning the fitness of both parents to raise the children.
The Court gave due consideration to all of the issues including
the moral character of both parents, the emotional stability of
the parents, the

personal

vs. surrogate

care

of

the minor

children by the parents, the lack of evidence of any drug or
alcohol

abuse

on

the

part

of

either

party,

the

religious

compatibility of the parties, the financial condition of the
parties, and the importance of keeping the siblings together.
(R. 207-209, 214-215)

It was only after considering all of these

issues that the Court concluded that neither parent was an unfit
parent and that the welfare of the children would be best served
by leaving them with the mother.
This Court in the case of Wall v. Wall, 700 P. 2d 1124
(Utah 1985) stated that where the evidence concerning custody
could support an award of the children to either party, the
Supreme Court would defer to the judgment of the Trial Court
since the Trial Court is in a better position to assess the
numerous

considerations

custody of the children.

that must

be determined

in awarding

It is the position of the respondent
13

that the Trial Court considered all of the relevant issues and
there is no basis to support the conclusion that the Trial Court
erred or abused its discretion in awarding the children to the
respondent.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR BY INEQUITABLY DIVIDING
THE ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE PARTIES
The Court's attention

is directed

to the introductory

remarks under Point I of this Brief which relate to the fact that
since

the

appellant

did

not

obtain

a

transcript

of

the

proceedings of the lower Court under Rule 11(e)(2) U.R.A.P. the
appellant should not be permitted to allege that the findings of
the lower Court was unsupported by or contrary to the evidence.
Point III of the appellant's Brief claims that the District Court
erred by inequitable assigning

the business liability to Dr.

Koerpel, but does not argue any issue of law.
Numerous witnesses, including two accountants, were called
by the parties

to testify as to the assets and liabilities

incurred by the parties during their marriage.

The respondent

had made a diligent effort to discover the assets and liabilities
of the parties, but had not obtained the cooperation of the
respondent.
file

a

motion

information.
week

Prior to the trial, the respondent was required to
to

compel

(R. 99-101)

the

appellant

to

provide

this

On October 28, 1985, approximately one

before the trial, the Court entered

an order

that the

parties must appear in the office of the respondent's attorney
for deposition.

(R. 141)

The failure of the appellant to
14

provide the information previously requested made it necessary
for the respondent to subpoena 19 separate parties to produce
records at the time of the trial concerning
financial affairs.

(R. 145-176)

the appellantfs

The failure of the appellant to

respond to the reasonable request for production of documents,
caused the Court to conclude in its Order denying the appellant's
motion for new trial that the appellant had failed to cooperate
with

the respondent

in her

attempts to discover

information

concerning the properties of the parties and that the defendant
had

ample

opportunity

to

discover

the

status

of

his

own

properties and to have had that information available at the time
of the trial*

The Court further found that there was no basis

for the appellant's contention that there was excusable error or
neglect in him not knowing the full nature and value of the
properties which he had acquired during the marriage.
The fact of the matter

(R. 289)

is that the appellant claimed to be

ignorant concerning the assets of the parties and refused to
cooperate in producing the necessary information prior to the
time of the trial.

Even with the information which had been

subpoenaed by the respondent, the Court found that on many of the
issues the evidence was not very clear.
awarded

(R. 206)

The Court

the business assets and liabilities to the appellant

because the appellant was the moving force behind the business
ventures, and because
...I think he is in a better position to handle the
liabilities. He is in a better position to know
what they are. I am also keeping in mind that in
my opinion the defendant has at all times had the
means to determine the actual state of his affairs.
15

I am not sure he has done so. In any event, he
will be responsible for those now...,. (R. 206)
The

appellant

in

his

Brief

attempts

to

address

the

responsibility of the parties concerning the business assets and
debts which were accumulated during the marriage.

Since the

appellant has not produced a transcript, he relies in part upon
the affidavits and motions which have been filed prior to the
divorce proceedings.

It is the position of the respondent that

those affidavits and motions cannot be relied upon in an appeal.
Each affidavit which was filed by the appellant prior to the
trial

was

opposed

by

an

affidavit

of

the

respondent.

An

affidavit may be relied upon by the Court in support of a motion
if it is unopposed.

However, when an affidavit is opposed by a

countering affidavit then the Court must take testimony and allow
direct and cross examination of the parties in order to determine
the facts.

There is no evidence before this Court that Judge

Roth, the Trial Judge, ever read or considered' the affidavits
that had been filed over a period of approximately one year in
support of motions made prior to the trial.

Judge Roth did

receive extensive testimony during the trial and based upon the
testimony and exhibits entered the property award which is being
appealed by the appellant.

All the parties who filed affidavits

before the Court prior to the trial, were present in Court and
presented testimony under oath.
It
Court's

is the position of the respondent

decision

was

adequately

supported

by

that
the

the Trial
testimony

presented at the trial and should be upheld by this Court.
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POINT III
THE COURT'S ORDER AWARDING THE RESPONDENT $100,000.00
OF THE SUM HELD IN THE MERRILL LYNCH MONEY MARKET
WAS LEGAL AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BY THIS COURT
This Court has ruled that the appellant may not argue
issues of fact and is restricted on this appeal to issues of law
only.

The appellant contends that the Employee Retirement Income

Security Act commonly known as ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
prohibits the Trial Court from requiring the appellant to deliver
$100,000.00

of

respondent.

The appellant also claims that the Divorce Decree

was not

the

a qualified

cash

held

domestic

with

Merrill

relations

order

Lynch

to

the

or a QDRO as

required in 29 U.S.C. § 1056(D).
The appellant did not raise these issues of the law before
Judge Roth during the divorce trial.
Memorandum

Decision

which

consisted

Reference to Judge Rothfs
of

eight

pages

will

demonstrate that there is not a single reference made to the
federal laws nor is there any indication that the Court has been
called upon to make a decision as to whether or not the Court has
the

authority

contained

in

to
the

distribute
Barry

Defined Benefit Plan.

J.

the

assets

Koerpel

(R. 202-210)

that

are

Professional

allegedly

Corporation

Likewise, there is no

reference to the federal acts or the ability of the Court to
disburse

assets

allegedly

held

in the Defined

Benefit Plan

contained in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Divorce
Decree which were prepared in this case.

(Re 211-222)

The

record is devoid of any objection filed by the appellant and his
counsel to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Divorce
17

Decree prepared in this matter.

Had the Trial Court neglected to

address an issue which had been introduced during the trial or
had

counsel

for

the

respondent

failed

to

included

that

information in the formal Findings, Conclusions, and Decree; the
appellant and his counsel would have objected.

The first time

that the record demonstrates the appellant or his counsel raises
the issues of the federal law is in a memorandum submitted in
support of the appellant's request for a new trial.

Paragraph 3

of that memorandum states that the appellant had contemplated
terminating the plan at the time of the trial. (R. 232)

That

memorandum then makes reference to the federal law concerning
defined

benefit plans.

No where in the memorandum does the

appellant contend that the federal issue had been raised during
the trial and that the Court failed to give due consideration to
it.

The memorandum is clear that the issue is being raised for

the first time on the motion for a new trial.

(R. 232-234)

The

Trial Court, in its ruling on the motion for a new trial in
Paragraph 3 of the Findings, stated that the Court would allow
the appellant a hearing to address the issues concerning awarding
part

of

the pension plans

to

the respondent.

(R. 289) The

appellant had the responsibility for setting the matter for a
hearing.

To date a hearing has not been requested on that issue

pursuant to the ruling on the motion for a new trial.

(R. 289)

The ruling on the motion for a new trial was signed by the
Judge Roth on the 6th day of March, 1986.

On March 7, 1986 the

respondent filed an Order to Show Cause asking in part that the
appellant be compelled to deliver the $100,000.00.
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In response

to that Order to Show Cause, the appellant raised the issue of
the federal acts and whether or not the Court could enforce the
provision of the Divorce Decree awarding to the respondent part
of the Defined Benefit Plan.

A hearing was held on that matter

and an Order was entered on May 20, 1986 by Judge Roth.

In

Paragraph 4 of the Findings, Judge Roth stated:
That the Court has considered the argument of the
defendant, that the Employment Retirement Security
Act (ERISA) prohibits the Court from transferring
the money held in the Merrill Lynch money market
certificates to the plaintiff because it is not a
qualified domestic relations order. The Court has
reviewed the law on this matter and finds that the
federal act does not prohibit the Court from
exercising its personal jurisdiction in ordering
him to terminate the plan. The Court finds that
the plan can be voluntarily terminated by Dr.
Koerpel and that the Court has the authority to
hold him in contempt if he fails to terminate the
plan and turn over the money as previously
ordered
(R. 442-443)
The appellant has not appealed to this Court from the
ruling of the Court on the respondent's Order to Show Cause dated
May 20, 1986.

While the appellant in his appeal did indicate he

was appealing from the decision on the Motion for New Trial, on
Page 1 of his Brief under Statement of Facts, the appellant
states that he is only appealing from the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Divorce Decree entered by Judge Roth.
Based upon the record referred to herein, the respondent contends
that the issue of federal law and its impact on Judge Roth's
Divorce Decree was not raised before the lower Court and cannot
be raised for the first time before this Court.
The

appellant

has

consistently

claimed

that

the

approximately $114,421.00 held in the Merrill Lynch Money Market
19

Fund belonged to the Dr. Koerpel Professional Corporation Defined
Benefit Plan.

It should be noted that the Defined Benefit Plan

is a plan supposedly created
corporation of Dr. Koerpel.

and operated

by a professional

As it turns outf the $114,421.00 was

held in the personal name of Dr. Koerpel.

After the Divorce

Decree had been entered in this matter and prior to the hearing
on the appellant's motion for a new trial, the respondent cause a
subpoena to be served upon Merrill Lynch.

As a result of that

subpoena a copy of a check made out to the appellant was produced
which demonstrated that the funds held with Merrill Lynch were
held in the individual name of the appellant and not in the name
of the Professional Corporation or the Defined Benefit Plan.
406-407)

(R.

The check demonstrates that on November 1, 1985, a

check was made out to Dr. Koerpel, the appellant, in the sum of
$87,881.00 and that check was deposited with Professional Pension
Services on the 7th day of November, 1985.
sum

was

retained

by

appellant, Dr. Koerpel.

Merrill

Lynch

under

The balance of the
the

name

of

the

The transfer of these funds was a direct

violation of a restraining order that was issued by the Trial
Court on November 5, 1985 restraining the disposal of any assets
during the pendency of the trial. The appellant did not disclose
the manner in which the funds were held nor that the funds were
being transferred during the trial of this matter.

In the Order

on Order to Show Cause entered on May 20, 1986, referred to by
the appellant in his Brief the Court found that at the beginning
of the divorce trial in this matter, the appellant held the money
with Merrill Lynch Money Market Certificate in his individual
20

name;

that

two days

after

the beginning

of the trial, the

appellant transferred a substantial part of that money into the
Dr. Koerpel Professional Corporation Defined Benefit Plan and
that there was a restraining order in effect at that point in
time.

(Re 442)
The

appellant

claims

that

the Trial Court

could

legally disburse the assets belonging to the Pension Plan.

not
That

Pension Plan was set up by a professional corporation and not by
the appellant as an individual.

At no time has the appellant

demonstrated that the $114,421.00 was a corporate asset which
could be placed in the Pension and Profit Sharing Plan.
the

position

of

the

respondent

that

the

appellant

It is
cannot

disregard the corporate entity and insist that an asset held in
his personal name is in fact a corporate asset and therefore
should be part of a corporate pension and profit sharing plan.
The appellant contends that he cannot be ordered by the Court to
deliver the funds to the respondent and held in contempt of court
for failing to do so.
power

of

individual

equity
and

to

to

The Utah District Court has an inherent
exercise

order

specific Court Order.

that

personal

jurisdiction

individual

over

to conform

an

with a

(Herzog vs. Bramel, (1933) 82 U.216, 23

P.2d 345
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Kessimakis vs.
Kessimakis, 520 P.2d 1090 (1978), stated as follows:
The Court has the power to find a person in
contempt of the authority of the court for
disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or
process. Disobedience of a valid, lawful order, in
proper form and regularly entered in a divorce
case, is a contempt of court.
On appeal, Dale
21

claims an absence of the elements of willfulness
and ability to payThe defense of inability to
comply with the court order is only effective where
the person charges exercises due diligence towards
compliance.
The trial court specifically found
Dale to have refused, failed and neglected to pay
the obligations imposed by the earlier judgment,
signifying a lack of due diligence.
The trial
court has considerable discretion in determining
the penalty for contempt which decision we are
herein inclined to affirm, particularly in view of
the fact that Dale has been afforded a means by
which he may purge himself of the contempt found.
If this Court were to conclude that the moneys in the
Merrill Lynch Money Market account were the property or assets of
the Defined Benefit Plan rather than the assets of the appellant,
the appellant has the right under the plan and under federal law
to voluntarily terminate the plan.

(R. 443)

The federal law

pertaining to Domestic Relations Orders or QDROs as set forth in
29 U.S.C. § 1056 (D) states as follows:
(D)
A Domestic Relations Order meets the
requirements of this subparagraph only if such
order—(i) does not require a plan to provide a
type of form of benefit, or any option not
otherwise provided under the plan...
The plan involved in this case can be voluntarily terminate by
the appellant

and the appellant intended to terminate the Plan

prior to the Divorce Decree.

(R. 232)

Consequently, the Court's

Order that the appellant withdraw from the Plan $100,000.00 to
pay to the respondent and if necessary terminate the plan, does
not violate the federal law and is a qualified Domestic Relations
Order.
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, in
the case of Savings and Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Employees v.
Rudolph G. GAGO, 717 F.2d 1045 (1983) addressed issues similar to
22

those now before this Court,
that

a

State

Domestic

The lower Federal Court had ruled

Court's

Order

requiring

that

the

defendant's retirement fund pay his spouse a portion of his
retirement was not pre-empted or in conflict with the ERISA Act*
The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision.

The Court reviewed

other Federal cases and concluded that the treatment given by
Federal law to military retirement systems and the railroad
retirement act was significantly different than a private pension
or

contribution

program.

The

Court

also

recognized

that

Wisconsin was not a community property state, but concluded that
since the state treated marital properties substantially the same
as did community property states, there should be no distinction
in the application of the Federal law to a non community property
state.

The Court specifically addressed those provisions of the

ERISA Act prohibiting assignment or alienation of the benefits of
a plan and 29 U.S.C. § 1056(D)(i).

The Court concluded that

those part of the Federal law did not pre-empt the decisions of a
state domestic court.

In addressing that issue, the Court stated

in part as follows:
Our uncertainty about Congress1 actual intent with
respect to the impact of section 206 on property
division need not lead to an impasse because the
Supreme Court has instructed us that when courts
face a potential conflict between state domestic
relations
law and
federal
law, the strong
presumption is that the state domestic relations
law is not pre-empted:
f

On the rare occasion when state family law has
come into conflict with a federal statute, this
court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause
to a determination whether Congress has "positively
required by direct enactment" that state law be,
pre-empted.
A mere conflict in words is not
sufficient. State family and family-property law
23

must do "major damage" to "clear and substantial"
federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will
demand that state law be overridden,
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

The approach must be practical,. ..The pertinent
questions are whether the right as asserted
conflicts with the express terms of federal law and
whether its consequences sufficiently injure the
objectives of the federal program to require
nonrecognition.f
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 281, 583,
99 S.Ct. 802, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979) (citations
omitted). See also McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220, 101
S.Ct. 2728, 2735, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981)
•

•

•

•

Since Congress has not spoken to the particular
subject before us here and since we perceive no
federal interest in ERISA that would require
nonrecognition of Wisconsin's property distribution
law, we think the presumption that the state
domestic relations law is preserved
is not
rebutted."
The Court recognized that a number of cases existed in which
spousal maintenance and child support was no affected by the
federal statutes and concluded that there was no distinction to
be drawn between spousal maintenance and child support and a
division of marital property.

The appellant in this case claims

that the domestic relations exception to the federal acts did not
apply because the plan was not in a pay status.

In addressing

that issue, the Court stated in part as follows:
"...Were we to address this point, however, we
would find that the prerequisite to upholding the
domestic relations exception s not strictly that
the pension fund be in pay status (i.e., actually
paying out benefits). Rather, the distinction is
properly whether the beneficiary has a current
right to the proceeds of the plan.
In the case
presently before us, the appellant had only to sign
a withdrawal application directed to the fund in
order to receive the proceeds of the plan...."
24

It should be noted that the defined benefit plan we are
dealing with in this case is a contribution plan and not a
pension plan. Consequently, there is no difficulty with whether
or not the benefits are vested nor with whether or not they are
in a pay status. The sums in the contribution plan can be
withdrawn voluntarily by Dr. Koerpel as was the case in the
federal case quoted above. (R. 443) If the Court concludes that
the money held with the Merrill Lynch Money Market Fund is a
valid asset of the contribution plan, then it seems that the case
cited is directly on point and indicates that a state domestic
court order is not pre-empted by ERISA or QDRO regulations of
federal law. The appellant contends that the 1984 amendment to
the ERISA act provided that a domestic relations order may not
require a plan to provide any type of form of benefit not
otherwise provided for by the plan. If that representation is
correct, it does not change the rulings entered by the federal
court cited above. The appellant had the right to terminate the
plan and intended to terminate the plan prior to the Divorce
Decree. (R. 232 & 443) Under any circumstances the federal law
cannot prohibit a state court from exercising personal
jurisdiction over an individual and finding that individual in
contempt of court if he fails to comply with a reasonable order.
In this case it is reasonable that the appellant take whatever
action is necessary to withdraw the money from the Merrill Lynch
account and distribute the money to the respondent as required.
25

It should also be noted that since the time of the Divorce
Decree in this matter the appellant has complied with the order
and has distributed to the respondent the $87,000•00 that was
deposited

with

pension

program

on

November

7,

1985.

The

respondent has also executed upon the Merrill Lynch account to
acquire

the

additional

appellant's name.

moneys which were still held

in the

In essence the appellant is requesting the

Court to enter an order that would require that the respondent
deliver this money back to the appellant or to his pension and
profit sharing program.
supersedeas
prohibit

bond

the

The appellant elected not to file a

in this matter, and consequently

respondent

from

proceeding

to

could not

execute

on

the

judgment.
CONCLUSION
The findings of the Trial Court wherein the respondent was
awarded

the custody

of the minor

acquired during the marriage
amply supported

children

and

the property

was divided between the parties was

by the evidence and was not contrary to the

evidence submitted before the Trial Court.

The appellant has

been limited to arguing issues of law before this Court.

The

appellant has not cited any law in support of its contention that
the custody and property distribution should be overturned that
does not rely upon an argument of fact.

The appellant, in his

Brief, has contended that the Court committed prejudicial error
in its decision, and since a transcript has not been provided may
not under Rule 11(e)(2) U.R.A.P. be granted relief by the Supreme
Court.
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The

appellant

contends

that

the

Trial

Court

cannot

disburse assets belonging to a defined benefit plan because of
the federal ERISA act.

The respondent contends that this issue

was not raised before the Trial Court in the divorce action, but
was subsequently considered by the Trial Judge in an Order on
Order to Show Cause.

The Order on Order to Show Cause has not

been appealed to this Court and the appellant may not raise this
issue for the first time on appeal. The respondent also contends
that the asset in question was held in the individual name of the
appellant and was not an asset held by the Defined Benefit Plan.
In the alternative, if the Court determines that the money was
part of the Defined Benefit Plan, the Order of the Court did not
violate the ERISA act and was a qualified Domestic Relations
Order as specified by the federal law.

In addition, the federal

act cannot deprive the Trial Court of personal jurisdiction over
the appellant nor the Court's authority to hold the appellant in
contempt if he does not comply with the Court's Order.
The

respondent

respectfully

requests

that

this

Court

affirm the decision entered by the Trial Court Judge*
Respectfully submitted this

day of January, 1987.

GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD

By
ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Respondent
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KOERPEL VS. KOERPEL
*

November 20, 1985

THE COURT:

2

Decision of Court

For the record, this is Koerpel vs. Koerjpel

it has been a hard case.

I think think that's any secretL

^

There have been many issues presented, and on many of the issues)

4

the evidence is not very clear.

5

simply cannot resolve.

6

There are some issues that I

As far as finding fault or blame for failed businesses,

7

I don ! t think that I can call that one way or the other.

8

evidence that both parties were living very well for a time.

9 J They were involved in several businesses.
10
H

There is

The businesses faileq

because of poor financial and business practices.
j

There has been a suggestion that the defendant caused

12 I the failure of some businesses, particularly the Meadows Dialysijs
13 j Center.
14

The evidence seems to be that he would have nothing

I to gain by doing that, much to lose.

I can't really determine

1£

> I that he is to blame for the failure of the Meadows Dialysis

16

Center by himself.

17

the plaintiff's position in that dialysis center was somewhat

18

of an artificial one.

19

I also think the evidence suggests that

If you have copies of Exhibit 17, maybe you could take

20

those and follow through with me, and I can tell you what value^

21

I have placed on some of the assets and liabilities.

22

Basically what I have done is I have used the value from

23

the sources that in my opinion were in a better position to

24

know what those values were.

25

The top of the list is cash $1,949.00.

I hope I haven1t forgotten anything.
NObody disagrees with

202

1

that figure, so I assume that's accurate, and that is the figure)

2

I am using.

3

dispute there.

I will adjust that figure for accounts receivable

4

of $26,629.00.

That's the defendant's figure for accounts

5

receivable.

6

accounts, and quite frankly due to the business practices that

7

if he collects that much, he will be doing well.

8

figure if $19,158.00.

9

there.

10

On the book value of $182,121.00 there is no

My thinking there is that due to the age of the

I am not using that.

The next

I am putting zero

The total *then for the business is $189,599.
Going down to the next item where I have numbers, Franklijn

11

Grove Limited Partnership, find a value of $20,000.00, based on

12

the plaintiff's witness's last testimony concerning that.

13

Research Park Limited partnership, $6,060.00.

14

automobiles, the same as listed.

15

value.

16

there is no dispute on that.

17

Equipment, there is no dispute as to that figure, I am leaving

18

that the same.

19

dispute as to that either.

20

i didn't put a value on it.

21

no longer in existence as a condominium.

22

The next item,

There is no dispute as to that]

Land, there is no dispute as to that.

Medical building,

I am leaving that the same.

The note receivable, $3,000.00, there is no
The Parkwest condominium number 40,
As I understand it, that asset is
Total $206,433.00.

The pension plan, I am valuing at $236,104.00.

That's tfcle

23

value that was placed on it by the defendant prior to cutting it]

24

in half for taxes.

25

this point where I can determine there is going to be a fifty

And there is no information that I have at

203

1
2

percent tax liability on that, may or may not be.
The personal residence I value at $300,000.00.

3

that was sold at foreclosure sale.

4

there was from that.

5

worth more at this time.

I am told]

I don't know what result

I am not in a position to determine it is

g

Household furnishing, $50,00.00.

7

Property in NOrth Carolina $15,000.00, and there is

8
g
10
H
12
13
14

No dispute there.

no dispute as to that.
10 percent contract receivable, $9,022.00, there is no
dispute on that.
Property on Southwell, $21,300 value, the same on both
of those.
Healy property at $15,520, valued the same on both of
those, so I am not changing that.

15

Iron Blosson Condominium timeshare, zero value.

16

Cash surrender life insurance policies $4,000.00 is

17

the same.

18

Total there is $414,842.

Total Assets $1,048,927.

19

The next page, liabilities.

The first three numbers

20

are the same, $162,000.00, $114,481.00, $35,144.00.

21

is no dispute as to those.

22
23
24
25

There

The note payable, I am applying a value of $66,000.00
to that.
The next item, property taxes are the same.
amount due is the same.

Construction

The $991.00 for the electric is the

same

204

1

Franklin

Grove Limited Partnership, the plaintiff has

2

$25,000.00 there as a liability.

3

taking zero.

4

MR. NEHRING:

The defendant has zero.

I am

If I may interrupt, your Honor, I

5

think if there is going to be an asset, there is going to be a

6

liability.

?

asset value to it*

8

The only reason ours was zero is we allocated no

THE COURT:

9

It was my understanding on Franklin

Grove that the $20,000.00 was the net figure.

That was

10

my understanding of the testimony on the final day.

11

Nuttal said he had priced it, it was worth $45,000.00, it would

12

have the liability against it of $25,000.00, which gives us

13

$20,000.00, which is the figure.

14

$3,45 2.00 for tanning beds.

15

The same with the Wisconsin debt.

16

medical building is the same.

17

are the same.

18

20

21
22
23

24

2

5

The obligation is the same.
Mortgage payable on the

All the remaining numbers there

I have added into that legal fees,

X9

And a
J

Mr.

total $53,201.00

debt to George Koerpel of $8,000.00.
There is a liability to Humana Med First on the defendant)'s

list of $32,337,00.

I am disallowing that.

I have total liability as $702,079.00.

Net assets

$346,884.00 Half of that would be $173,424.00.
In determining how to distribute those assets, I have
kept in mind some impressions from the evidence

and one of
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1

those is that the defendant was in a position where he was

2

ordered to make payments on the house, and for whatever reason

3

failed to make payments.

4

to make the payments.

5

obligations against the house.

g

harmless from those.

7

construction debt.

8

9

And it could be that he was not able

So I will award him the house, plus all
And he is to hold the plaintiff

And those include the mortgages and the

I am also keeping in mind that in my opinion the defendant
was the moving force behind all of the business ventures, so he

10

will inherit,all business assets and all business liabilities.

11

I think he is in a better position to handle the liabilities.

12 I He is in a better position to know what they are.
13

I am also keeping in mind that in my opinion the

14

defendant has at all times had the means to determine the

15

actual state of his affairs.

I am not sure he has done so.

16 I In any event, he will be responsible for those now.
17

What I will do with regard to the assets then is award

18

to the Plaintiff household furnishings with an assigned value o^

19

$45,000.00, the automobiles, with the exclusion of the one that

20

the defendant has, with a value of $20,900.00, note receivable,

21

ten percent note receivable, the value of $9,022.00 and

22

$100,000.00 from the pension plan.

23

She has some options there.

She may take it all in

24

cash, or she may take a note from McMasters.

I believe that's

25

been valued, discounted value at $47,000.00.

That's the value
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1

assigned by the defendant.

2

cash, she can have that note at her option.

3

If she elects to take the note and

I don't know what you are going to do with that plan.

4

there is a way to distribute those and make it a non-taxable

5

event, work it out any way you can.

6

If]

The toughest decision for me was the custody decision.

7

I have been over Dr. McVaugh's report many times, and I

have

8

gone down through the list of the facts,that the Supreme Court

9

suggests that I consider.

Most of those come out as kind of

10 ha wash.
11

They talk about things like keepting siblings together.

12

I don't see that as *a serious factor in this case.

Moral characjter

13

of both parents, I see that as coming out about even.

14 J stability of both parents, I see it as roughly even.

Emotional]
Whether

15

they can give personal versus surrogate care.

16

that's been pretty much even.

17

be that Plaintiff in this case is going to be in a better position

18

to give personal care.

19

In the past

I think in the future it could

No evidence of drug or alcohol abuse on the part of eithej

20

party.

21

Step parent status doesn't enter into it.

22

I don't think will be a factor by the time we are finished.

23

Religious compatability does not seem to be a factor.
Financial condition

What I do consider to be factors are the following:

24

the fact that the psychological tests and the results favored

25

the defendant in this case is a definite factor, and is a plus

9n>7

1

for the defendant in this case,

2

recommendation for one or the other, but a mild recommendation.

3

I see it as a — n o t as a strong

On the other side of that, on behalf of the plaintiff,

4

I think that there is evidence that she was the primary care

5

provider during most of the children's lives.

6

there is some value in continuing the previous arrangement

7

where it seems to be working.

8

factors than the results of the psychological tests.

Q

And I think that

Those to me are more important

I am not satisfied that the' evidence shows the defendant

10

would be a superior parent-at-all,. And .1 am not satisfied he

H

will be a superior parent to the extent that I should move the

12

children from where they are now into his custody.

13

awarding custody to the plaintiff in this case.

14

may have visitation every other weekend, 6:00 p.m. Friday to

I am

The defendant

15 | 8:00 p.m. Sunday; alternate holidays, the Father's Day, whether
16 I it falls'on his weekend or not.

Plaintiff will have Mother's

17 I Day whether it falls on her weekend or not.

Have Christmas

18

visitation 2:00 p.m. Christmas day for three days.

19

in the summer-

Six weeks

20

With regard to child support and alimony, I am not in a

21

position to determine precisely what the defendant's income is

22

at this point.

23

I am assuming his income is $6,000.00 a month gross.

24

that in mind, support will be $1,170.00 for the children, and

25

I will award alimony in the amount of $800.00 per month for

For purposes of this, making this decision,
With

208

1

an indefinite term, with the understanding that I am going to

2

keep jurisdiction of this case.

3

three years, when things stabilize, and when I say when things

4

stabilize, I am finding that both parties are in a position

5

of financial instability at the present time, the plaintiff

6

is going to have to go to work.

7

The defendant at this p o i n t — w e l l , during the next three years

8

I think is going to have to decide based upon the outcome of

9

I his other trials, what his income is going to be and what kind

And any time during the next

There is no question about that).

10

of a future he has financially.

11

modification on those awards during the next three years.

12

So there may be room for

And at any time that there appears to be either evidence

13

that the situation has stabilized pretty much as it is now, or

14

that there is a significant change, you can come in without

15

showing a change of circumstances and have this reviewed.

16 J

With regard to attorney fees, each pay their own attorneyj

17

fees and costs, with the following exception.

18

will pay $3,000.00 towards the plaintiff's costs and attorney

19

fees due to various delays during the discovery process caused

20

by the defendant.

21

I believe that's it.

22

MR. ECHARD:

23

on a couple of matters?

24

THE COURT;

25

M R . ECHARD:

The defendant

You Honor, could I ask for clarification

Alright.
You indicated the defendant assumed

2°<)

1

all the businesses and the business liabilities.

2

include the tanning clinics?

3
4

THE COURT:

Everything.

All businesses, all businesjs

liabilities, they are his responsibility.

5

MR. ECHARD:

6

THE COURT:

Does that

Anything else?

No, your Honor.
That means all the assets and that meansj

7

that your client signs whatever documents are necessary

8

transferring that to him.

9

MR. ECHARD:

Fine, I have nothing further.

10

THE COURT:

Mr. Nehring?

11

MR. NEHRING:

12

MR. ECHARD:

13 J

THE COURT:

No.
I assume I prepare the order, your Honojr,

Yes.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
Attorney for Plaintiff
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
801-621-3317
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JUDITH A. KOERPEL,
BINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and
ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
BARRY JON KOERPEL,

uivil

No. 90432

Defendant.

The defendant's motion for a new trial came on for hearing
before the Honorable David E. Roth on the 29th day of January,
1986, at 9:45 a.m.
attorney,

Robert

The plaintiff was represented in Court by her

A. Echard,

and the defendant was present in

Court an represented by his attorney, Ronald Nehring.

The Court,

having heard argument from the parties and being fully informed
in the premises, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

ihe Court found at the time of the trial that neither

party was unfit and that the plaintiff had been the primary care
provider during the marriage and had custody of the children from
the time of the Divorce Decree until the time of the hearing.
LAW OFFICE OF

jrridley, Echard
&Ward
635 - 25TH STREET
)GDEN, UTAH 84401

The

Court

considered

all factors

presented

at the trial Aand

Rocoraea DOOK J.- t-> *2

p.o, . 1 9 9 4 - I
indexed

decided

that

the

informa fion

cause the Court to transfer

presented

was

the custody

not

from

sufficient

to

the primary care

provider.
2.

The

cooperate

with

information
defendant

Court

the

plaintiff

concerning

had

finds

ample

the

that
in

the
her

property

opportunity

defendant
attempts

of

the

to discover

failed

to

to

discover

parties.

The

the status of his

properties and to have had that information available at the time
of

the

trial.

The

Court

finds

that

there

is

no

basis

for

excusable error or neglect in not knowing the nature and value of
the property which had been acquired during the marriage.
3.

The

Court

will

allow

the defendant

a hearing

to

address the defendant's issues concerning awarding part of the
pension

plan

sums

to the

plaintiff.

The

defendant

shall be

responsible for setting this matter for a hearing,
4.

The

defendant

is

restrained

from

disposing,

transferring, or encumbering any of the funds held in the pension
plan program until

such time as a hearing

can be had on this

matter.

1.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
That the defendants motion for new trial should be

denied.
2.

That a restraining order should be issued restraining

the defendant from disposing of or transferring any assets held
under the pension and profit sharing plan until a hearing can be
had in this matter.
W OFFICE OF

lley, Echard
&Ward
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ORDER

1.

That

the

defendant's

motion

for

a new

trial

is

denied.
2.
transferring
pension

or

That the defendant is restrained from disposing of or
any
profit

of

the

assets

sharing

plan

held

in

until

the Barry

further

J.

Koerpel

hearing

on this

matter.
3t

That the issue of attorney's fees for the motion for

new trial is held in abeyance^y
DATED this <^P

0f

/
.-. - ' ,t

^bruary, 1986.

&ttrri5rt'. ROTH
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order was mailed, postage prepaid, this
"7

day of February, 1986, to Ronald E. Nehring, Esq., 424 East

500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JUDITH A, KOERPEL,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AtfO ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
BARRI JON KOERPEL,
Civil No. 90432
Defendant.

The plaintifff s Order to Show Cause came on for hearing
before the Honorable David E. Roth at 11:00 a.m. on the 21st day
of April, 1986.

The plaintiff was present in Court represented

by her attorney, Robert A. Echard*
in Court, but was represented

The defendant was not present

by his attorney

Ronald Nehring.

The Court having received a proffer of evidence from the parties,
having heard argument from the parties, and being fully informed
in the premises, now therefore, makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the defendant is delinquent in child support

through the 21st day of April, 1986, in the sum of $217.00 which
represents
LAW OFFICE OF

ridley, Echard
&Ward
J5 - 25TH STREET

periods

of

sums
time

he

has

during

withheld

from

child

support

which

has

visited

with

he

fo*L the
thej^inor*

children.
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That the defendant his f&iisa 'to return the children

2.

according to the previous Court Order concerning visitation and
that

Order

should

remain

in full force and effect

and

if the

defendant fails to pick up the children within one hour of the
time ordered by the Court, then the plaintiff may assume he will
not

exercise

return

the

his visitation rights.
children

at

the

time

That the defendant

set

in the

original

shall

Divorce

Decree,
3.
Divorce

That the Court finds that at the beginning of the

trial

$112,000.00
defendants

in this matter

the defendant

held

approximately

in a Merrill Lynch Money Market Certificate in the
individual

name.

That

the defendant

claimed

that

said funds were part of a pension and profit sharing plan and on
approximately November 7$ 1985i two days after the beginning of
the trial in this matter transferred a substantial part of that
money

into

the

Benefit Plan.

Dr.

Koerpel

Professional

Corporation

Defined

That at the time there was a restraining order in

effect which as issued by the Court at the end of the first day
of trial on November 5f 1985.
4.
defendant,
prohibits

That the Court has considered
that the Employment
the

Court

from

Retirement

transferring

the argument
Security

the

money

Act
held

of the
(ERISA)
in

the

Merrill Lynch Money Market Certificate to the plaintiff because it
is

not

a qualified

domestic

relations

order.

The

Court

has

reviewed the law on this matter and finds that the Federal act
does
LAW OFFICE OF

not

prohibit

the

Court

from

exercising

its

personal

jurisdiction over Dr. Koerpel in ordering him to terminate the

Gridley, Echard
&Ward
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p l a n . The Court f i n d s t h a t the plan can be V o l u n t a r i l y

terminated

by Dr. Koerpel and that the Court has the authority to hold him
in contempt if he fails to terminate the plan and turn over the
money as previously ordered.

The defendant shall take whatever

actions are necessary

to turn over said

within

shall

30 days which

becomes
plan

necessary

in

order

be by May 21, 1986.

to terminate

to

comply

sums to the plaintiff

the

with

pension

the

and

Court's

That

profit

Order,

if it
sharing

then

the

defendant must do so.
5.
the

That there should be approximately $25,000.00 held in

Merrill

Koerpel.

Lynch
That

Money
the

Market

plaintiff

account
should

in
be

the

name

awarded

of

an

Dr.

order

transferring said funds to the plaintiff in a sum not to exceed
$100,000.00.
May 19>

However, said order shall not be effective until

1986, in order to give the defendant an opportunity to

have a hearing in the Federal lawsuit which has been filed in
connection with this matter*
6.

That

the issue raised in the plaintiff's Order to

Show Cause requiring the defendant
the lawsuits

being

brought

to assume legal defenses on

as a result

of the debts

incurred

during the marriage and the awarding of attorney's fees incurred
in the defense

to the date of this hearing is reserved

handled by Brief on the part of the parties.

to be

The Court does find

that Attorney Hobert A. Echard has incurred attorney's fees in
the

sum

Security
LAW OFFICE OF
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of

$1,900.00

Bank,

by

in

defending

Jacqueline

lawsuits

Jackson,

and

brought
by

Mark

by
J.

First
Benson

against the defendants.
3

GDEN, UTAH 84401

443

Page I J . O . . I .
Indexed
7.

That

defending
Order

the

to Show

attorney's fees

the plaintiff has incurred

defendant's
Cause

Motion

for

and various

a New

hearings

Trial

and

in the sum

for

for

this

of $750 •00

and should be granted a judgment against the defendant in the sum
of $750.00.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the plaintiff

should

be awarded

a judgment

for

delinquent child support in the sum of $217.00.
2.
having

That

the

visitation

ordered

defendant

rights

by the Court

and

shall

with

return

them

at

the children

the

if the defendant

times

fails

after

originally

to pick up

the

children within one hour of the time specified in said order, the
plaintiff may assume he will not exercise his visitation for that
period.
^e held

That . the

in

contempt

y

>ney|js hel/S / in

t'rket
(ft/G*rr&-^phe
necessary
pension

to

and

account

in

defendant

transfer
profit

sa4d
sd^d

sharing

the

should

t£k§

if

the

actions

_are
_

terminating

tl
the

;ever
whatc.__

necessary,

H^rrtill
;o

sum

moneys/ including
moneys/
plan

j£#e

of

within

30

days

which shall be by May 21, 1986.
4.
the

moneys

account

in

That the plaintiff should be awarded the ownership of
presently
the

name

$100,000.00 provided

held
of

in

Barry

said order

the

Merrill

Koerpel

in

Lynch
a

sum

Money
not

to

Market
exceed

shall not become effective until

May 19, 1986.
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5.

That

attorney 1 s fees
this Order

the
for

appearing

on

That

defendant

shall

out

not

the

in

the

defense

issues

assume

of

or

the

debts

shall be reserved

those

the

during

be

a new

for

trial

and

to

or

not

plaintiff

on

lawsuits

marriage

attorney's

date

by the

whether

their

awarded

actions

and briefed

for

a judgment

of $ 7 5 0 . 0 0 .

defend

should

motion

pertaining

incurred

plaintiff
of

and

bu—arw "krded

the

to Show Cause in the sum

6.

arising

' Recorded B
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plaintiff sliuuld

in

the

and

the

whether

fees

incurred

of

$1,900.00

sum

parties.

ORDER
1*

That

delinquent

child

2.
previous
return

time

Divorce

defendant

the

fails

will

to

defendant
Order

at

the

pick

in

said

not

is

awarded

in the sum of

Decree

children

specified

plaintiff

support

That

the

defendant

the

up

is

the

order

exercise

ordered

children

his

in

comply

with

the

to

to

specified

then

judgment

said

$217»00.

pertaining

time

a

visitation

therein;

within

one

plaintiff

visitation

for

the

and

to

and

if

the

hours

of

the

assume

the

may
that

visitation

period.
3»

That

the

defendant

is

held

in

contempt

of

Court

h\

fo

0vQ^ro~frh-»-.^ainti^
defendant

is

to

Jake- whatever

said m o n e y s , including

actions

terminating

are
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moneys

That

presently

the
held

plaintiff
in

the

is

to

the pension and profit

plan if necessary, within 30 days which
4.

necessary

sharing

shall be by May 2 1 , 1986.

awarded

Merrill

transfer

Lynch

the

ownership

Money

Market

of

the

account

5
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in the name of Barry Koerpel in a sum not to exceed $100,000.00
provided

said

order

shall

not

become

effective

until

May 19>

1986.
5*

That

the

plaintiff

is

awarded

a

judgment

for

attorney1 s fees for appearing on the motion for a new trial and
this Order to Show Cause in the sum of $750.00*
6.
defendant

That
shall

the

assume

issues
and

pertaining

defend

the

whether

or

not

the

plaintiff

on

lawsuits

arising out of debts incurred during their marriage and whether
or not the plaintiff should be awarded attorney1s fees incurred
in the defense of those actions to date in the sum of $1,900.00
shall be reserved and briefed by the parties.
DATED this

day of May, 1986.

. ROTH, District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order was mailed,
postage prepaid, this

X*"d., of

May, 1986, to Ronald E.

Nehring, Attorney for Defendant, 424 East 500 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111.
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